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Die Philosophie löst Knoten auf in unserm Denken; daher muß ihr Resultat einfach sein, 
das Philosophieren aber so kompliziert wie die Knoten, welche es auflöst.1 
L. Wittgenstein, Zettel, § 452 
 
 
1. Map of the Problematique (Some Background) 
 
In a series of papers we have been developing a proposal for a novel 
methodology to ‘read’ the archaeological record in order to overcome a number 
of problems posed by the reliance of contemporary palaeoanthropology on such 
ill-defined notions as ‘modern behavior’ and ‘symbolic culture’ (Balari et al. 2008, 
2011; see also Benítez-Burraco et al. 2008 and Balari et al. 2010 for some additional 
background). Our proposal is based on the idea that a formal analysis of the 
material remains left by our ancestors may prove useful in determining the kinds 
and amount of cognitive resources deployed to produce such objects, in other 
words, that manufactured objects are transparent with respect to the biological 
structures underlying the processes necessary to produce them. By performing 
such an analysis, we contend, one is capable of inferring the computational 
complexity of the said cognitive tasks and to advance hypotheses concerning the 
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    1 “Philosophy unties knots in our thinking; hence its results must be simple, but philoso-
phizing has to be as complicated as the knots it unties” (translation by G.E.M. Anscombe). 
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architecture of the mind capable of performing them. Our hypotheses were 
framed against the background of a general model of the architecture of minds 
we only sketched in the papers referred to above, but which cross-fertilized with 
a parallel proposal to apply the same methodology in the context of the study of 
animal cognition in general (Balari & Lorenzo 2008, 2009, to appear). 
 This more general framework relies on the contention that animal minds/ 
brains are all constructed following a very similar pattern. This claim is mostly 
grounded in the fact that developmental systems tend to follow rather conserva-
tive pathways and easily fall into canalization patterns (Waddington 1957) or 
follow certain developmental inertias (Minelli 2011 and Striedter 2005 for compa-
rative developmental data on vertebrate brains), but also finds support on a 
number of neuroanatomical, molecular and other kinds of data we’ll try to spell 
out in the paragraphs to follow. 
 The main architectural component in our model is a core engine or natural 
computational system (NCS) subserving some (but not necessarily all) of the 
main cognitive functions of an animal mind, including low-level ones like motor 
planning and execution. This NCS is a serial, digital, von Neumann machine 
implemented on an analog, parallel and continuous substrate,2 which may be 
modeled by an abstract machine or automaton in the sense of the mathematical 
theory of formal languages and automata. We call these abstract models 
‘computational phenotypes’ in order to make explicit the idea that computational 
activity is a phenotypic trait that one can associate to certain specific neuro-
anatomical configurations. Computational phenotypes are thus abstract charac-
terizations of the basic models of computation implemented by the said neuro-
anatomical configurations, and since phenotypic differences are eminently 
structural in nature, it makes sense to capture the differences between compu-
tational phenotypes by appealing to differences in structure between models of 
computation. Therefore, the natural place to look at in order to provide an 
abstract structural characterization of a model of computation is automata theory 
as developed in connection with formal language theory. We will have more to 
say about formal language theory in section 2, especially with respect to its 
relation to the theory of computational complexity, but for the time being suffice 
it to say that it is concerned with the structural complexity of ‘languages’, where 
‘language’ here is a technical term referring to sets specified as collections of 
strings made up of symbols taken from a finite alphabet. Thus, for example, the 
set of integers Z = {…, –1, 0, 1, …} may be represented in binary by the language 
made up of strings over the alphabet Σ = {0, 1} as Z = {…, 10000001, 00000000, 
00000001, …}, for an 8 bit system.3 
                                                
    2 The idea that the brain is an analog, parallel processor that nonetheless implements serial, 
digital processes is supported by evidence coming from different fields, such as neural 
computation (Sarpeshkar 1998, 2009), neurobiology (Alle & Geiger 2006, Shu et al. 2006) and 
neuropsychological models (Zylberberg et al. 2011). This, in fact, adds an extra dimension of 
variation to the ones to be proposed below, namely the possibility that the neural 
computations underlying certain behaviors follow the analog, parallel path instead of the 
digital, serial one. We will have nothing to say about that in this paper, but see Balari & 
Lorenzo (to appear: chap. 8) for discussion. 
    3 Unless otherwise stated, and in addition to Chomsky’s original papers cited in the text, our 
basic references in the following informal presentation of language and automata theory are 
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 Since its original development by Noam Chomsky in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s (Chomsky 1959; 1963), the theory’s main goal has been that of 
classifying languages (in the technical sense just defined) in a hierarchy of 
increasing complexity, the so-called Chomsky Hierarchy. Traditionally, the 
Chomsky Hierarchy is assumed to be organized into four classes (sets of 
languages) related by proper containment as follows: Type3 ⊂ Type2 ⊂ Type1 ⊂ 
Type0. Type3 (regular) languages are the structurally simplest ones and Type0 
(recursively enumerable) languages the more complex ones, with Type2 (context-
free) languages and Type1 (context-sensitive) languages sitting in between these 
two extremes of the complexity spectrum. 
 Now, given that languages are just (possibly infinite) sets of strings defined 
over a finite alphabet, they incorporate no direct record of their complexity, but, 
as Chomsky showed, this can be assessed indirectly by studying the complexity 
of the finite devices capable of specifying them — grammars and automata. As 
for grammars, different degrees of complexity are obtained by successively 
imposing constraints on the format of rules to go from unrestricted grammars for 
recursively enumerable sets to right- (or left-) linear grammars for regular sets. In 
the case of automata, the difference in structure follows from the constraints on 
the working memory space the device has at its disposal to perform the 
computation, with Turing machines having infinite space (and time) resources to 
work with and finite-state automata having no working memory space at all. 
This focus on memory space may seem unjustified at first blush, because, unlike 
the case of grammars, the traditional characterization of automata is not easily 
seen as a series in which each automaton is defined as an extension of the 
immediately preceding one. Thus, whereas the pushdown automaton is just like 
a finite-state automaton with a memory stack (plus the minimal adjustments to 
its finite control unit to be able to manipulate the stack), the linear-bounded 
automaton for context-sensitive languages is a Turing machine whose memory 
working space is constrained by the length of the input string, that is, it can only 
use the space in the input tape already occupied by the input string. This is 
clearly a constraint on memory, but it is hard to see how it relates to the 
structural properties of the stack of a pushdown automaton. This relation only 
became obvious after the work of K. Vijay-Shanker and David Weir (Vijay-
Shanker & Weir 1994, Weir 1992, 1994) who, building on original work by Nabil 
Khabbaz (1974), showed that a language hierarchy can be defined with context-
free languages being the first in the hierarchy and extending into the space of 
what traditionally fell under the label of Type 1 languages.4  
 Vijay-Shanker and Weir’s results came together with the demonstration 
that the pushdown automaton, the corresponding machine model for context-
free grammars, is just a particular instance of a more general class of automata 
using pushdown storage and differing only in the structure of the storage mecha-
nism. Thus, on the basis of these results, we could conceptualize the universe of 
languages as a space organized into three properly contained sub-hierarchies of 
                                                                                                                                 
Hopcroft & Ullmann (1979) and Lewis & Papadimitriou (1981). 
    4 As far as we can tell, it remains open the question whether this sub-hierarchy includes all 
recursive languages in addition to just the context-sensitive ones and excludes the 
recursively enumerable languages that are not recursive. 
Biolinguistics    Forum   
 
82 
increasing structural complexity: 
 
(i) The Regular Hierarchy 
(ii) The Pushdown Hierarchy 
(iii) Unrestricted Systems 
 
 Thus, the Pushdown Hierarchy contains all those languages that, like the 
context-free languages, can only be recognized by an automaton making use of 
some kind of pushdown storage. Similarly, the Regular Hierarchy contains the 
so-called Subregular Hierarchy (Rogers & Hauser 2010, Rogers & Pullum 2011) 
and includes, at its maximal level of complexity, the regular or finite-state 
systems. The general machine model for the Regular Hierarchy is the finite-state 
automaton. These systems are devices capable of performing computations — 
often very complex ones — without resorting to any external storing device. 
Finite-state automata are, therefore, systems with no memory whose 
computational power relies exclusively on the (finite) number of states the 
machine can be in. Pushdown systems, on the other hand, do possess an external 
storage device (the so-called pushdown stack), which they can manipulate to 
help and drive the steps of a computation. Complexity within the Pushdown 
Hierarchy, where Type 2 and Type 1 systems are properly included, increases as 
the structure of the pushdown stack is made richer and stack embeddings are 
allowed within stacks, making it possible to perform more and more complex 
computations without actually altering the basic processing regime of the whole 
device. Let us emphasize the fact that the only difference between a finite-state 
automaton and a pushdown automaton is the presence of the memory stack in 
the latter, but, for the rest, both are essentially the same kind of device, with the 
minimal adjustments in the finite control unit of the pushdown automaton to 
allow for the operations of writing and erasing symbols from the stack (or stacks 
if it is of a more complex type). 
 Seen in this way, the complexity hierarchy more clearly illustrates that 
computational power is just a function of memory or, in other words, of the space 
resources a computational device has at its disposal. This is, according to our 
proposal, a first dimension of variation for NCSs. More concretely, we would like 
to suggest that NCSs are constructed on the basis of a very conservative core 
engine, always following the same processing regime, which can nevertheless be 
complemented by a working memory device. The presence/absence and 
sophistication of this working memory component will determine the 
computational capabilities of the system, such that a NCS with no memory will 
be less powerful than one with memory, and, within the class of NCSs with 
memory, those with complex and sophisticated memory systems will be more 
powerful than those with a more basic working memory.5 
                                                
    5 Leaving aside the case of unrestricted systems (Turing machines), which constitute a special 
case, our bipartite division between a regular and a pushdown hierarchy can also be 
motivated on computational complexity theory grounds. Thus, regular systems correspond 
to those languages in the set SPACE(k), where k is an integer, that is to those languages that 
can be decided in constant space or, in other words, to those languages for which the space 
resources used by the decision procedure are independent of the length of the input, which 
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 Before we go on, it is important to point out that our use of the term 
‘working memory’ has little to do with any psychological model of memory, as 
for example the Working Memory of Baddeley (2007) and to which Frederick 
Coolidge and Thomas Wynn (e.g., Coolidge & Wynn 2004, Wynn & Coolidge 
2011) have referred in their work on the Neanderthal mind. Our computational 
phenotypes are, crucially, not performance models, but abstract characterizations 
of the models of computation over which a full-fledged performance model may 
be constructed. According to this, a vertebrate brain can thus be characterized in 
terms of its computational phenotype (Balari & Lorenzo 2008, 2009, to appear), a 
characterization in complexity terms focusing on the computational model of the 
NCS that the said brain implements. Thus, if the analysis of some form of 
behavior reveals that the complexity of the computations necessary to perform 
the task is equivalent to a finite-state automaton, we can conjecture that the 
computational phenotype of the NCS implemented in the brain of this creature 
is, at least, of the regular type; similarly with the other possible computational 
phenotypes, with the one corresponding to the human NCS being capable of 
processing language and hence sitting, at least, within the mildly context-
sensitive region of the complexity space. 
 In some sense, then, our proposal can be seen as an extension of an 
experimental paradigm originally initiated by W. Tecumseh Fitch and Marc 
Hauser, based on the aural pattern-recognition abilities of cotton-top tamarins 
and reported in Fitch & Hauser (2004); see also O’Donnell et al. (2005) and Rogers 
& Hauser (2010). The same paradigm was later applied to starlings, with 
seemingly equal success by Gentner et al. (2006), although it has been subjected to 
several criticisms from different quarters (e.g., Perruchet & Rey 2005, Heijningen 
et al. 2009, Petersson et al. 2010, Rogers & Pullum 2011). The main difference 
between what we are proposing here and the assumptions of aural pattern-
recognition experiments is that instead of focusing on learning capabilities our 
suggested methodology proceeds in the reverse direction, from the behavioral 
patterns the subject is naturally capable to perform to their structural complexity 
and, from there, to the minimal model of computation required for the task, and 
it is thus immune to the shortcomings observed by, for example, Rogers & 
Pullum (2011) that affect aural pattern-learning experiments. 
 Thus, what we have characterized here as a NCS roughly corresponds to 
what Hauser et al. (2002) called the Faculty of Language in the narrow sense 
(FLN), but our characterization is broader in the sense that we do not conceive of 
our NCS as either language-specific or human-specific. Indeed, even though we 
follow Hauser et al.’s (2002) methodological proposal of distinguishing between 
narrow and broad aspects of some cognitive ability, we deny to their FLN its 
human and language specificity, whence our terminological switch here to NCS.6 
                                                                                                                                 
is tantamount to saying that no memory is required in the process. For all languages in the 
pushdown hierarchy, on the other hand, the space resources spent during decision will be 
some function of the length of the input, and consequently some storage mechanism is 
required. We come back to this in section 2, but see Papadimitriou (1994) for details. 
    6 Something that — we are ready to acknowledge this — we should’ve done before in order 
to avoid misunderstandings stemming from our infelicitous use of FL in contexts in which 
the term was clearly inappropriate. 
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 Now, from all this it follows that NCSs are functionally unspecific devices, 
i.e. not specially tailored to perform one or another cognitive task. NCSs just are 
capable of executing a recursive procedure capable of constructing more or less 
complex representations as a function of the input and the memory resources 
available.7 NCSs therefore, in order to be operative, need to be connected to some 
external modules supplying their input and capable of receiving their output. 
Seen from this perspective, external modules impose a number of constraints on 
the workings of a NCS, mostly concerning certain properties having to do with 
the nature of the input and certain properties concerning the nature of the 
output, but, crucially, these constraints will have little, if anything, to say about 
certain structural properties of the objects produced by the NCS, since these will 
critically depend on the memory resources available to the recursive procedure 
implemented by the NCS. There is thus a tension between the interface 
conditions imposed by the external systems and the computational capabilities 
inherent to the NCS which defines a two-dimensional space of variation, with 
one of the axes corresponding to the working memory space the NCS has access 
to and the other axis corresponding to the number and kind of the external 
systems the NCS interfaces to. Thus, following Hauser et al. (2002), the minimal 
architectural requirements for human language are a NCS with a computational 
power at least equivalent to that of a mildly context-sensitive system interfaced 
to a Sensory-Motor module and a Conceptual-Intentional module. 
 Putting now this whole view in a broader perspective, note that this model 
opens up new avenues of research within the field of cognitive archaeology in 
particular and cognitive science in general, since, given the two dimensions of 
variation we envisage here, a number of different possible configurations for 
‘other minds’ can be imagined. For example, it is possible that a linguistic 
phenotype has existed with the same external systems as the human one but 
interfaced to a less powerful NCS; or one lacking some of the interfaces necessary 
for the full externalization of thought; or one simply not yet fully satisfying the 
interface constraints imposed by the external systems; similarly for other 
cognitive abilities different from language, and as already suggested above, for 
other cognitive abilities in other animal species. The question, of course, is 
eventually an empirical one, and the methodology we are proposing here can be, 
in our opinion, a useful tool for clarifying all these questions. 
 The general model we’ve just outlined in the foregoing discussion is not 
merely a product of our speculations, but, as we pointed out at the beginning of 
this section, there exist numerous pieces of evidence coming from several other 
                                                
    7 The issue of ‘recursion’ has become a debated question since, at least, the publication of 
Hauser et al. (2002). Here, following Tomalin (2007, 2011), we will adhere to the termino-
logical distinction between ‘recursion’ and ‘self-similar embedding’. The first term refers to 
the property, common to a number of computational devices, of being able to take as input a 
number of objects of some specific type in order to produce a new object or set of objects of 
the same type which in turn may later feed a subsequent step in the computation to produce 
new objects of the same type and so on. The second one refers to a structural property 
observed in the objects produced by certain computational devices with the appropriate me-
mory resources (minimally, a push-down stack), like, for example, expressions in a natural 
language. Thus, to get objects with self-similar embedding some recursive procedure must 
be applied, but not all applications of a recursive procedure necessarily yield objects with 
the property of self-similar embedding. 
Biolinguistics    Forum   
 
85 
areas of research that seem to point in the same direction. What follows is a brief 
delineation of this evidence. 
 To begin with, there exists abundant clinical evidence suggesting the 
comorbidity among diverse disorders entailing deficits of diverse sort that can be 
yet construed as equivalent in computational terms. For instance, people affected 
by Williams-Beuren syndrome exhibit linguistic (Karmiloff-Smith 2006) and 
visuo-spatial deficits (Hudson & Farran 2010), which are interpretable in terms of 
processing problems with context-free and context-sensitive operations. Simi-
larly, the prevalence of drawing deficits among dyslexics is a well-known fact, 
which invites to explain their state in terms of a visuo-constructive deficit (Eden 
et al. 2003, Lipowska et al. 2011), or even better, of a more general deficit affecting 
the rule abstraction mechanism inherent to sequential learning, which would 
impair both linguistic and visuo-motor abilities (Vicari et al. 2005, Pavlidou et al. 
2010). Finally, it is also commonly observed that language and motor deficits co-
occur developmentally (Webster et al. 2005, Cheng et al. 2009, Iverson & Braddock 
2011; see Rechetnikov & Maitra 2009 for a meta-analysis), implying that 
voluntary motor actions entail diverse motor primitives or ‘movemes’ (Del 
Vecchio et al. 2003) arranged in different ways according to specific combinatorial 
or syntactic rules (see Flash & Hochner 2005, and references cited therein). All 
this well-attested comorbidity is easily explained if one and the same computati-
onal device is affected. 
 Current neurobiological research provides us with the most compelling 
evidence for the plausibility of our model. For example, dissimilar linguistic 
modalities, such as sign and spoken languages, otherwise equally complex in 
structural terms (Brentari et al. 2010), are processed by similar brain mechanisms, 
as attested by numerous neuro-imaging and lesion studies (MacSweeney et al. 
2008, among many others). This evidence gives support to the idea that the NCS 
is unspecific in functional terms, but capable of coupling to different modules for 
exteriorizing its outputs. Besides, the brain seems to remain on basic neural 
‘binding mechanisms’ (like cortical synfire chains) to generate any kind of 
composite objects at the representational level (Flash & Hochner 2005: 663), and 
there is ample neuro-imaging evidence supporting the hypothesis of different 
kinds of computations being performed by a ‘central’ device (see Dipietro et al. 
2009 with regards to drawing). Eventually, fMRI studies show that similar 
patterns of activation arise in response to diverse tasks if they are computati-
onally equivalent, ultimately suggesting that the same brain areas (and plausibly, 
the same computational device) are involved. For instance, drawing bilaterally 
activates a wide network of subcortical and cortical structures (Makuuchi et al. 
2003), many of which are also involved in language processing (see Makuuchi 
2010 for a review). 
 Although the precise topography of the neural substrate of such 
computational device is somehow controversial, it plausibly relies upon the 
coordinated activities of diverse brain areas, both cortical and subcortical. For 
instance, according to Lieberman (2000, 2002, 2006) language is tantamount to a 
computational device capable of processing symbolic elements, with this device 
conceivably being the outcome of the interaction between a sequencer (the 
activity performed by the basal ganglia) and a working memory (the activity 
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executed by diverse cortical structures). In a similar fashion, Ullman (2001, 2004) 
has hypothesized that a procedural memory exists (ultimately emerging from the 
coordinated activities of a complex network of cortical, subcortical, and cerebellar 
neuronal populations) that allows for the existence and functioning of “the 
mental grammar, which subserves the rule-governed combination of lexical items 
into complex representations” (Ullman 2004: 231). Crucially, both Lieberman’s 
computational device and Ullman’s procedural memory are ultimately conceived 
as to subserve the learning and execution of diverse tasks, both linguistic and 
non-linguistic, so when this neural architecture is damaged an admixture of both 
linguistic and non-linguistic symptoms are observed in affected people.  
 This is the case, for instance, of Huntington disease, a neurodegenerative 
condition in which a defective variant of the HD protein accumulates in the cell 
nucleus and cytoplasm, specifically killing the gabergic neurons of the caudate 
(Gusella & MacDonald 2006), and thus plausibly disturbing the neural substrate 
of the sequencer in our model. In affected people pervasive problems with the 
application of rules are observed during language processing; however, the 
disease also encompasses a defective processing ability of motor routines, as well 
as other diverse cognitive deficits and psychiatric disturbances (Gusella & 
MacDonald 2006). Other neurological pathologies affecting the basal ganglia 
exhibit quite similar phenotypic profiles. For example, Parkinson disease is also 
caused by a selective damage of some components of this subcortical region, to 
be precise, the dopaminergic neurons that project to the substantia nigra (Surmeier 
et al. 2010). Once again, linguistic and motor deficits regularly co-occur in 
affected people (Grossman et al. 1991, Duffy 2005). In the whole, we recurrently 
observe that language disabilities correlate to a variety of neuropsychological 
and motor changes in all these conditions (see Murray 2000, for a review of Hun-
tington and Parkinson diseases). 
 The abnormal development of this neural circuitry through mutations of 
any of the genes involved in its organization also renders symptoms that are not 
domain-specific. A classic (but still illustrative) instance is the first mutation to be 
identified on FOXP2. In people bearing the R553H substitution, the primary 
pathology is located in the caudate, but other brain regions, otherwise relevant 
for language processing, are also structurally and/or functionally impaired 
(Vargha-Khadem et al. 1998, Watkins et al. 2002a, Belton et al. 2003, Liégeois et al. 
2003). In fact, there is ample evidence supporting some key role of FOXP2 in mo-
dulating the development and functioning of (specific) cortico-thalamic-striatal 
circuits associated to motor planning, sequential tasks, and procedural learning 
(for a review, see Marcus & Fisher 2003, Vargha-Khadem et al. 2005, Fisher & 
Scharff 2009), a brain network which could plausibly match the neural substrate 
of our NCS. Although there is a hot dispute around the precise phenotypic 
profile (and the underlying deficit) of the disorder linked to the mutation of the 
gene, motor and linguistic deficits are simultaneously observed in affected 
people (Gopnik 1990, Vargha-Khadem et al. 1995, Watkins et al. 2002b, Vargha-
Khadem et al. 2005, Shriberg et al. 2006), thus precluding this condition from 
being merely characterized as a speech or even a (specific) language disorder. 
Animal models reinforce the functional unspecificity of the neural circuitry 
FOXP2 contributes to (Shu et al. 2005, Fujita et al. 2007). 
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 Finally, acquired damages of important constituents of the neural substrate 
of our NCS also give rise to deficits of diverse condition, eventually reinforcing 
the functional non-specificity of the device. For example, a focal damage of the 
left basal ganglia (in particular, of certain frontal-subcortical circuits) symptoma-
tically manifests as a decreased ability in both verbal and visual modalities 
(Troyer et al. 2004), and both limb movements and language are impaired when 
cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical circuits are damaged, as observed in 
drawing, overwriting and repeating words and phrases in absence of external 
commands (Fung et al. 1997). 
 This is just a sample we’ve recently compiled, which could easily be 
extended with further data, but one that clearly suggests that evidence from 
neurobiology is amenable to an interpretation entirely compatible with the model 
sketched here. 
 That said, we let’s turn now to the objections. 
 
2. The Correct Use of Soap (and a Conclusion) 
 
Now that we have provided a detailed account of our ideas, we are in a better 
position to address David J. Lobina’s criticisms. We will start, however, with 
some general comments on a point Lobina does not directly touch on in his note, 
but which remains implicit in most of what he says, so we deem it necessary to 
get into that before turning to other issues.8 
 A key feature of our proposal is that the processing capabilities connected 
to FL in humans are independent from any domain of conceptual primitives, 
even those dedicated to belief fixation, planning, and the like (‘thought’, roughly 
speaking) that, according to recent minimalist theorizing, conflate with FL into a 
unitary domain (Hinzen 2006, Chomsky 2007). Notwithstanding the fact that 
Lobina refrains from discussing general features of mental architecture in his 
paper, a clarification of our particular view of the computational mind is in order, 
as he has elsewhere referred to it as “bizarre”, “incoherent”, and “strange” (Lo-
bina 2012) and continues to cast doubt on its soundness in the Biolinguistics piece 
(this issue, p. 76), attributing to us assumptions that we do not really share. 
 As a matter of fact, we do share certain background assumptions with 
Lobina, to wit: (1) That thoughts are bona fide (i.e. contentful) representations; and 
(2) that contentful representations are language-like entities — i.e. something 
along the lines of Fodor’s 1975 LOT hypothesis (Lobina 2012: 2–3).9 We think that 
these are reasonable assumptions, but not because their truth is somehow 
warranted: Thoughts could happen to be some kind of brute-causal associationist 
networking, instead of contentful representations, and contentful representations 
could happen to be map-like, instead of language-like, entities. Yet, as observed 
for example by Devitt (2006), (1) and (2) are the most successful hypotheses thus 
far in predicting other people’s behavior as well as in explaining the productivity 
and systematicity of thought, among other things; in other words, it is not their 
                                                
    8 All references to Lobina’s work including only a page number are to his paper “All tied in 
knots”, published in this issue of Biolinguistics. 
    9 This other paper by Lobina is not paginated, so page numbers in our references to it should 
be interpreted as ‘first page’, ‘second page’, and so on. 
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purported truth what makes them respectable, but rather their explanatory force. 
We share this set of convictions with Devitt, as we think Lobina does. 
 So we accept (with Lobina) the idea of an autonomous thought domain, 
whose primitives are easily accessible for computations that map them into 
complex thoughts. However, the thesis that the processing competence that we 
use in composing meaningful expressions (say, sentences) is inextricably linked 
to the existence of rich contentful, language-like thoughts (which Lobina mista-
kenly attributes to us) is not in our opinion a favored hypothesis on plausibility 
grounds similar to that of (1) and (2). Thus, contrary to the adoption of the 
representational theory of mind and the LOT hypothesis as default premises 
given the state of the art of cognitive science and philosophy of mind, a similar 
move is far from warranted with respect to the question of intrinsically 
connecting the processing capabilities of mind with the kind of concepts and 
intentions that it is able to deal with. The clearest statement in this direction that 
we are aware of presents this processing competence as an adaptation to the 
evolved function of composing (and subsidiarily expressing) complex thoughts 
(Devitt 2006, Chomsky 2010). We think, however, that adaptationism provides no 
sufficient grounds for favoring such a hypothesis, for reasons that are explained 
at length in Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini (2010). Here we just want to remember 
that George C. Williams, one of the most brilliant evolutionary biologists of the 
20th century and an adaptationist himself, defended that adaptations, far from 
being seen as default explanations, should be treated as explanatory last resorts. 
The reason is simple: The long, cumulative and highly complex chains of events 
leading to true adaptations are not to be expected to occur very frequently 
(Williams 1966). So the idea that a processing competence exists as an adaptation 
for the elaboration and expression of thoughts is not one to be contemplated in 
the absence of very (very) strong evidence and, as a first move, we should reject 
it. 
 The impact of these observations on establishing and exploring a 
reasonable view of the architecture of mind is in our opinion clear: The thesis that 
there exists a processing competence inextricably and exclusively connected to 
the rich conceptual competence in charge of belief fixation and the like looses all 
the beforehand motivation that it has under the umbrella of adaptationism; and 
so, we become free to explore the alternative idea that the said competence has an 
independent evolutionary history, not linked to any conceptual, sensory or motor 
domain in particular, as well as the complementary idea that it has gained access 
to different cognitive domains throughout hominid evolution (or evolution 
without more qualifications, as it could happen to be a very ancient trait; see 
Balari & Lorenzo 2008, 2009, to appear). The idea boils down to the supposition 
that humans make complex beliefs for the same reasons that they make complex 
arguments, complex paintings, complex poems or complex knots (which is not to 
say that knots, poems, paintings, and especially arguments are always complex). 
In other words, we support the idea of decoupling linguistic competence into 
autonomous components, in the spirit of Hauser et al. (2002) save the important 
detail that we envision its core processing component (i.e. the NCS) as not 
language and not even human specific. We honestly wonder what is so weird 
about this idea. Its truth is not warranted, of course (as almost everyone else’s 
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ideas in the field), but it opens paths worth being explored (and more clearly 
amenable to empirical testing than most theses in the field). Are we not Fodorian 
enough? Not neo-Chomskyan enough (perhaps to Lobina’s surprise)? Granted, 
but to this we can only reply one thing: There’s life beyond authorities. 
 Therefore, it is against this general background that must be construed our 
claim that some important aspects of knot-tying abilities might be parasitic on 
language in humans. According to our view, whatever cognitive modules 
participate in knot-tying abilities crucially share the same computational basis 
with those participating in linguistic abilities. We will immediately turn to knots, 
but, before, we’ll need to go back to automata, performance models and compu-
tational complexity. 
 Lobina’s criticisms are articulated along two main themes: Our purported 
misuse of complexity results deriving from formal language theory and the 
theory of computational complexity, on the one hand, and what in his opinion is 
an illegitimate appeal to topology in our claims concerning knotting abilities in 
humans, on the other. Both points are eventually connected, but we shall respond 
to them in turn, and only towards the end will we be able to tie all the threads 
together. 
 As for the first point, Lobina pretends that we are mixing questions of 
weak generative capacity with questions of strong generative capacity and 
leaping from there to illicitly inferring that natural language has a specific 
inherent computational complexity. It appears then that some steps in the 
argument have escaped Lobina’s attention, so we’ll try to spell them out in full. 
 Recall that the Chomsky Hierarchy classifies languages according to their 
structural complexity and that such complexity can only be assessed through the 
devices that are capable of specifying one or another language. Thus, if the 
structural complexity of a set can only be assessed with respect to one or another 
model of computation, it should not come as a surprise that Chomsky has always 
insisted on the fact that what is important in the study of a language (any 
language, natural languages included) is its grammar, not just the strings that 
make it up. This observation is at the core of the whole generative linguistics 
enterprise, since, as also pointed out by Chomsky, there are many possible 
different grammars one can think of capable of generating exactly the same 
stringset; we shall say in this case that these grammars are all ‘weakly equivalent’ 
or that they have the same ‘weak generative capacity’.  
 The challenge, when our focus of interest is natural language, is, therefore, 
which of all the imaginable weakly equivalent grammars is the one that really 
captures the actual structure of natural language expressions or, using 
Chomsky’s own words, which grammar is the descriptively adequate one. Note 
that descriptive adequacy is defined not just with respect to weak generative 
capacity but, rather, with respect to a stronger condition incorporating the notion 
of structural description. Thus, two weakly equivalent grammars are not 
necessarily also ‘strongly equivalent’, i.e. they do not necessarily assign the same 
structural descriptions to the strings of a set or have the same ‘strong generative 
capacity’. Note that the notion of strong generation somehow transcends the 
notion of model of computation, since grammars and automata as defined in 
formal language theory, are only weak generators, not strong ones, they do not 
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assign structural descriptions to strings in a set.  
 Importantly, though, this does not make all the complexity results 
presented in the preceding discussion irrelevant, because another crucial 
outcome of Chomsky’s original work is that, whatever the descriptively adequate 
grammar for natural language eventually turns out to be, its power will be 
beyond that of context-free grammars, and, as shown in later work also reported 
above, it most probably lies within the power of a mildly context-sensitive one. 
These are “the limits of finite-state description” (and of context-free description) 
that according to Chomsky (1956, 1957) force linguistic theories to turn to more 
powerful devices than finite-state and context-free grammars. Thus, the only 
reason for saying that the grammar of a natural language is some mildly context-
sensitive grammar is precisely that only a grammatical formalism of this power 
will be able to generate the appropriate structural descriptions. Note, however, 
that these complexity results refer to the inherent structural complexity of natural 
language and are therefore independent from the kind of grammatical formalism 
we may want to favor as our theory of linguistic competence. They set a lower 
bound of complexity in the sense that an adequate grammatical formalism 
should possess at least the same expressive power of a mildly context-sensitive 
grammar. Now, since for each grammar there is a corresponding automaton, it 
doesn’t make much difference on which perspective we want to put the emphasis 
when concerned with such inherent structural complexity of language. 
 Moreover, as the preceding discussion suggests, we must assume that a 
type-token relation exists between a grammar of a specific type (say, a context-
free grammar) and a grammar generating some specific language (say, some 
context-free language); similarly with automata. Our computational phenotypes 
are types precisely in this sense, and, consequently, to repeat, they are not — 
cannot be — performance models, just basic specifications from which 
performance models can be built. Thus, if we ever wanted to build a parser P (a 
strong generator) for some language given some grammar G, we should base our 
construction on the appropriate model of computation A (a weak generator), 
because parsing presupposes recognition. That much seems to have escaped 
Lobina’s attention, as he constantly insists on stating that automata are just 
recognizers and not generators, but as Chomsky (1963: 332) already made clear a 
long time ago: 
 
“It is immaterial whether we picture an automaton as a source 
generating a sentence symbol by symbol as it proceeds from state to state 
or as a reader switching from state to state as it receives each successive 
symbol of the sentence it accepts.”  
 
And, if any doubt was left about the fact that parsing presupposes recognition, 
take the following quote from Earley’s (1970: 95) original paper describing his 
popular parsing algorithm for context-free grammars: 
 
“A recognizer is an algorithm which takes as input a string and either 
accepts or rejects it depending on whether or not the string is a sentence of 
the grammar. A parser is a recognizer which also outputs the set of legal 
derivation trees for the string.” (Emphasis in the original.)  
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 Thus, since our proposal is clearly noncommittal to any specific model of 
grammar, a large part of Lobina’s subsequent observations concerning grammar 
formalisms and parsers constitute a blatant non sequitur that only adds confusion 
and deviates the discussion form the real point. And the point is, in this case, that 
anyone interested in building a performance model should pay attention to these 
structural facts concerning the complexity of human language in order to be 
successful. But not just to these, because there are also questions of compu-
tational complexity that need to be taken into account. Enter the theory of 
computational complexity, then. 
 Before getting into the details, it is crucial to make clear that both the 
Chomsky Hierarchy and the theory of computational complexity are concerned 
with languages and with their classification into classes.10 Of course, the criteria 
for their classification are different in each case, but it is important to see that 
some language that falls in some class in the Chomsky Hierarchy will also show 
up in some computational complexity class and therefore connections can be 
established between the inherent structural complexity of this language and its 
inherent computational complexity. Thus, as we already pointed out in footnote 
5 above, the languages that fall within the regular class in the Chomsky 
Hierarchy are exactly the ones conforming the SPACE(k) class of computational 
complexity theory, therefore we know that any two regular languages (i.e. of 
identical structural complexity) have also the same computational complexity. 
This point is critical, because anyone failing to appreciate this might fall in the 
trap of believing that we are juggling with complexity classes and jumping from 
one perspective to the other and back without much justification. We’re afraid we 
were jumping too fast, so let’s proceed at a slower pace. 
 Computational complexity theory is concerned with sets but it looks at 
them as if they were problems. As with any problem, we want to know if there’s 
a solution forthcoming in the near future and, in this case, how hard it is to solve 
it.11 The point here is that any problem we may think of can be represented as a 
language and, accordingly, that everything reduces to analyzing the complexity 
of language recognition problems. Since structural complexity is here not an 
issue, there’s no need to consider different models of computation, indeed, the 
strategy is to fix a specific model of computation and to see how it behaves when 
dealing with different problems. The model of computation of choice for 
computational complexity theory is the k-string Turing machine, which can 
however be set to operate at different modes of computation — deterministic and 
nondeterministic — in order to establish certain complexity measures.  
 Finally, complexity is defined as the amount of time and/or space 
resources spent by the machine in order to solve the problem, where time is 
defined as the number of steps needed to solve the problem and space as the 
                                                
    10 Our basic references for this presentation of computational complexity theory are Lewis & 
Papadimitriou (1981) and Papadimitriou (1994). 
    11 Therefore, the universe of sets the theory of computational complexity deals with very 
much transcends that of the Chomsky Hierarchy, since it sometimes discovers that some 
sets represent utterly intractable problems, that are not even recursively enumerable. 
Remember that the Chomsky Hierarchy includes only all the recursively enumerable sets, 
but not the non-recursively enumerable ones. 
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number of cells in the tape visited by the machine during the computation. 
There’s a twist here, however, that needs to be made explicit to make complexity 
results more understandable. Turing machines are very powerful devices and, in 
principle, they have unlimited amounts of time and space to perform a 
computation and, since when concerned with problems we also want to know if 
they can be solved efficiently, we need to put some constraints to this unlimited 
capacity of Turing machines. For this reason, computational complexity theory is 
actually concerned with defining the time and/or space bounds within which a 
problem can be solved efficiently. The usual practice is to determine the upper 
bound, i.e. the worst case, beyond which efficiency severely degrades, but it is 
also possible to determine a lower bound of complexity for a problem, such that 
if we are able to determine that the lower bound for a problem is in complexity 
class C, we know that the problem is at least as hard as any of the hardest 
problems in C (it could be harder), and we say that the problem is C-hard. 
 Now, back to complexity measures in terms of time and space, these are 
defined as functions on the length of the input string telling us the rate at which 
time or space grow as the length of the input grows, expressed f(n) = O(g(n)), 
where n is the length of the input. There are different possible functions of this 
kind, but the ones that most concern us here are O(nc) and O(cn), where c is a 
constant in both cases, and referred to as polynomial and exponential, 
respectively. Thus, when we say that an algorithm runs in time O(n3), as it is the 
case with Earley’s (1970) parser, for example, we are actually stating that, in the 
worst case, it will spend an amount of time equal to the cube of the length of the 
input, and we will classify it in the class TIME(n3). Note that, in principle, there 
are infinitely many TIME classes like the preceding one since the exponent of the 
function can be any integer,12 but all sharing the property of defining polynomial 
time bounds. The union of all these classes is the complexity class P. Given this 
definition, it is clear that P is in fact a hierarchy of polynomial time classes, with 
some classes including harder problems than others. The hardest problems in P 
are the P-complete problems, where a C-complete problem, C a complexity class, 
is a problem that is at least as hard as any of the hardest problems in C (i.e. it is 
C-hard) and it is known to be in C.13 Moreover, P is a deterministic class, 
meaning that any problem within this class can be solved efficiently in poly-
nomial time by a k-string Turing machine working in deterministic mode. 
 Nondeterministic time classes are a bit different. This is mostly due to the 
fact that non-determinism is still a poorly understood notion and that the 
definition of recognition is weaker for nondeterministic Turing machines than it 
is for deterministic ones (Papadimitriou 1994: chap. 2, for details). Given the fact 
that a nondeterministic Turing machine, at any point of the computation, has at 
least two choices to follow, time measures do not refer to all the possible steps in 
a single computation (these would be too many) and are calculated differently 
                                                
    12 Another assumption within computational complexity theory is that the exponents in 
polynomial functions are somehow ‘well-behaved’ in the sense that they never become too 
large to make the problem effectively intractable, even if polynomial. 
    13 Complete problems are thus ‘model’ problems since both their lower and their upper 
complexity bounds are defined by the class they belong in, e.g., a P-complete problem is at 
least as hard as any problem in P, but not harder. 
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assuming that at least one path yields to acceptance. The most important non-
deterministic time class is NP (for Nondeterministic Polynomial) and, like P, is 
defined as the union of all nondeterministic classes with polynomial characteris-
tic functions. The discovery that some problem is in NP means that the Turing 
machine will reach a solution following some path and that the correctness of the 
solution can be verified through a succinct certificate (or polynomial witness) in 
polynomial time. The succinct certificate is an external device that can be 
consulted every time a ‘yes’ state has been reached and that provides an efficient 
procedure to check the result.14 As we will see presently, the existence of succinct 
certificates for all problems in NP is a datum that in some cases has been 
interpreted as having implications for cognitive science. 
 Turning briefly to space complexity classes, these are constructed in exactly 
the same way as time complexity classes, with the proviso that space is taken to 
be a more costly resource than time because it can be reused. In the case of space, 
then, polynomial functions identify very hard problems, close to intractability. 
For this reason, when dealing with space, logarithmic or linear bounds are 
preferred over polynomial bounds, although the class that will be of interest for 
us here is, precisely, PSPACE (for Polynomial Space), which is a deterministic 
class. 
 Finally, the three classes considered here are related by inclusion, 
composing the following hierarchy of increasing complexity: P ⊆ NP ⊆ PSPACE. 
Note that the inclusions are not known to be proper, meaning that the classes 
might turn out to be equal. Indeed, the question whether P = NP is one of the 
most important unsolved problems in complexity theory. 
 Now, back to natural language, we’ve seen that, structurally, it is more 
complex than context-free but less than context-sensitive, with a structural 
complexity equivalent to that of a mildly-context sensitive language. Recall that 
these complexity results refer to sets and that these very same sets will appear as 
members of some computational complexity class represented as recognition 
problems. The problem CONTEXT-FREE RECOGNITION15 is in P; the problem 
CONTEXT-SENSITIVE RECOGNITION is in PSPACE;16 then, the problem MILD-
CONTEXT-SENSITIVE RECOGNITION should fall somewhere in between, or within 
any of the two bounding classes. Note that this inference is entirely independent 
from any consideration concerning parsing, choice of grammatical formalism, or 
any other architectural or formal consideration about performance models. It is, 
if anything may be characterized in this way, a fact following from the inherent 
structural properties of the languages considered and from their analysis as 
recognition problems. Now, thanks to the work of Eric Sven Ristad, we can add 
some very interesting results to the previous inference that square perfectly with 
it.  
 Very briefly, but see Ristad’s (1993) monograph for the details, Ristad 
                                                
    14 Therefore, the definition of NP that Lobina gives his note is, to say the least, non-standard, 
when he writes that “the algorithm will define multiple ways of processing the input with-
out specifying which one it will take, in polynomial time” (p. 75). 
    15 We follow the established convention in computational complexity theory of setting 
problem names in small capitals. 
    16 It is in fact PSPACE-complete. 
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analyzed the inherent computational complexity of some linguistic problems and 
came to the conclusion that natural language computations are NP-complete. The 
relevance of Ristad’s results, regardless now of their accuracy, is that he derived 
them independently of any consideration concerning specific linguistic theories, 
performance models, and so on, which, in his opinion, legitimizes his claim that 
“[t]he upper and lower bounds of our proposed complexity thesis are tight 
enough to tell us exactly where the adequate linguistic theories are, not only 
where they are not” (Ristad 1993: 14). Thus, Ristad takes his results as something 
with strong implications at the time of building competence/performance 
models, in the sense that these models will have to be accommodated to the in-
herent NP-completeness of natural language.  
 Indeed, according to Ristad, the fact that language is in NP runs against the 
modularity thesis, as he interprets the existence of the certificate as the 
demonstration that the computational system subserving language has access to 
external information available to verify the correctness of the computations. This 
is not a proof, of course, but it is a good example of how mathematical results 
may have some bearing on hypotheses in cognitive science and may help to 
articulate them, something, by the way, that Lobina sees with a big dose of 
skepticism when he writes (p. 74) that “the computational complexity of natural 
language processing will have to consider properties of human psychology such 
as memory limitations, the strategies that are employed in parsing, the use of the 
immediate context and many other factors. All in all, it is simply not known what 
computational complexity our mental machinery exhibits in the processing of 
language”. We, on the other hand, with Ristad, rather believe that it is the task of 
psycholinguists to incorporate these results when building their performance 
models, that whatever memory limitations they postulate, whatever parsing 
strategies they propose, etc., should take into account the inherent 
structural/computational complexity of natural language. It is perhaps a matter 
of epistemological priority — what should come first? — and, certainly, a 
debatable one, but nothing in Lobina’s piece actually suggests that he has even 
the hint of an argument against this idea nor against the idea that this very same 
strategy can be fruitfully applied to other domains of cognition. 
 Let’s turn to knots, then. To start with, remember that our hypothesis that 
human knotting abilities might be ‘parasitic’ on linguistic abilities must be inter-
preted in the context of an architectural model for (some areas of) the mind 
according to which a single NCS may underlay more than one cognitive ability. 
The term ‘parasitic’ is therefore to be interpreted in the sense of ‘sharing compu-
tational resources’, with such resources being a NCS with specific computational 
properties. Whence our proposal that, if the complexity of the cognitive tasks 
associated to knotting abilities were equivalent (or higher, we cannot discard this 
possibility a priori) to that of linguistic abilities, this could constitute an indirect 
datum at the time of reading the archaeological record, which, so far, shows a 
strong correlation between the presence of language and knotting. In our attempt 
to ground on a more formal basis Camps & Uriagereka’s (2006) original insights 
in this connection, we turned our attention to topology and the mathematical 
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theory of Knots.17 Lobina finds this outrageous mostly because “the knots that 
[Knot Theory] studies have nothing to do with real knots” (p. 74), to which it 
should be added our presumed misinterpretation of a number of complexity 
results in Knot Theory. We’ll discuss these in turn. 
 Leaving aside Lobina’s bold statement, we would like to note first that 
Knot Theory is not as disconnected from ‘reality’ (whatever that means) as 
Lobina wants us to believe it to be. To be sure, Knot Theory was originally moti-
vated to solve a number of problems in organic chemistry and it has thereafter 
found a number of other applications in several areas of biochemistry and 
physics; see Adams (2004) for some historical background and examples of these 
applications. Obviously, that Knots find their application in organic chemistry, 
for example, is not a demonstration that a relation also exists with the knots one 
uses when sailing, fishing, mountain climbing, or building a hut. We could cut 
that story short by just referring to the acknowledgements footnote in the 
opening of this paper, but we’d rather dwell on this a bit more in order to try to 
unearth the reasons behind Lobina’s skepticism. 
 One such reason could be the fact that a Knot is defined as an embedding 
of a circle (S1) into a sphere (S3) — denoted S1 → S3 — or, alternatively, as an 
embedding of S1 in Euclidean space R3. That much has the net effect that a Knot 
must be visualized as a closed structure and not as an open one, as it would be 
the case, for example, with a sailing line tied to get a bowline. Note, however, 
that this definition is adopted essentially for practical purposes, since it ensures 
that Knots are finite objects, but, apart from that, nothing prevents us to define a 
Knot as the embedding of a tangled line whose two ends extend infinitely into R3 
(Jaume Aguadé, p.c.). Well, yes, there’s yet another reason: The embedding could 
not then be in S3 (the sphere being a surface delimiting an area of space R3), given 
the infinite length of the line, and the homeomorphisms defined in order to 
determine equivalence relations between Knots could not then be defined as S3 → 
S3 (i.e. relations between embeddings in a sphere), and should be defined 
differently. That much, in our opinion, should nevertheless not obscure the fact 
that Knots can legitimately be taken as models for knots. To strengthen this point, 
consider the following (informal) definition of a Knot in terms of a knot by 
Adams (2004: 1–2): 
 
Take a piece of string. Tie a knot in it. Now glue the two ends of the string 
together to form a knotted loop. The result is a string that has no loose ends 
and that is truly knotted. Unless we use scissors, there is no way that we can 
untangle the string.  
 A knot is such a knotted loop of string, except that we think of the 
string as having no thickness, its cross-section being a single point. The knot 
is then a closed curve in space that does not intersect itself anywhere.  
 
This is a fairly intuitive way of describing a Knot and we invite the reader to 
follow Adams’s recommendation and to tie an overhand knot and close it 
afterwards (an electrical extension cord is good for the experiment because it can 
                                                
    17 In the following discussion we will capitalize the word ‘knot’ when referring to mathe-
matical entities in order to distinguish the Knots of Knot Theory from the knots of sailors, 
for example. 
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be plugged to itself in order to close the knot… or is it a Knot?); or try with a 
bowline (in both its British and Dutch versions) to see that it is equivalent to a 
Knot with six crossings. Some fiddling will perhaps be needed with the cord, but, 
with some practice, one will eventually be able to get something that clearly 









Figure 1:  The overhand knot (left) and the trefoil Knot (right). Just close the two loose ends of the 
knot to get the Knot. (The trefoil image has been generated with the KnotPlot© software developed 
by Rob Scharein.)  
 
 For the sake of completeness, Knots can also be represented in a format that 
comes closer to knots in the form of braids. A braid is a collection of vertical lines 
fixed at their two ends to two rigid parallel horizontal bars, such that when they 
are not tangled each line cuts a horizontal plane parallel to the two bars only 
once. In fact, a knot more closely resembles a braid consisting of a single knotted 
line, but it happens that braids are Knot generators, such that when we detach 
them from the bars and we close them we get a Knot.18 Braids and Knots are 
therefore equivalent such that, for example, the trefoil (or threefoil) Knot and its 
equivalent braid (the overhand knot) can be described by the same braid word 
σ1
3 (Adams 2004). 
 Anyway, a criticism based on the purportedly illegitimate application of 
the mathematical theory of Knots to some aspect of ‘reality’, apart perhaps from 
upsetting a fair number of mathematical realists, strikes us as the same as 
contending that those areas of physics, chemistry or musical theory that make a 
fruitful use of group theory are incongruous just because groups are such 
abstract algebraic structures and so much divorced from reality — what on earth 
has a group to do with the structure of crystals? That’s outrageous! 
 So much for the question of legitimacy. Of course, from the fact that Knots 
are perfectly good models for knots it does not follow that they are good models 
for cognitive representations of knots. This point certainly deserves some 
attention. 
 One of the inconveniences one faces when trying to investigate the 
cognitive abilities involved in the act of tying a knot and in the (creative) act of 
inventing one19 is the lack of relevant studies on the topic. So far, the only studies 
                                                
    18 Not always, i.e. not any closed braid actually generates a Knot, but the reverse is true: Any 
Knot is equivalent to a closed braid. 
    19 Lobina (2012: 10) accepts the possibility that “many knots in history came about acci-
dentally”. Well, maybe, but not very many of them. Everyone minimally acquainted with 
knot tying techniques will see this: Perhaps the overhand knot did, but it is highly impro-
bable that the same happened with, for example, the bowline. 
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we have been able to track down concern experiments with humans or apes (see 
Michel & Harkins 1985 and Tracy et al. 2003 for humans and Herzfeld & Lestel 
2005 for apes), focusing on the learning of the relevant motor sequences needed 
to produce a number of (relatively simple) knots. An interesting aspect of these 
studies is that in all cases the levels of success are extremely low — for example, 
in the study by Michel & Harkins (1985) only 37% of the subjects were able to 
learn to tie the three proposed knots by just attending demonstrations of how to 
do it, i.e. by just observing the necessary motor sequence to tie them. This, for us, 
is an indication that knotting abilities have little (if anything) to do with the 
accurate internalization of a motor sequence. This suspicion is reinforced by the 
personal experience of some of us with knot tying (and knot learning), since, at 
least in our cultural tradition, complex knots are taught not through the 
description of some hand gestures, but rather by resorting to mnemonic tech-
niques whereby the learner is able to figure out the number and the direction of the 
crossings that make up the knot. These, admittedly scant, observations seem to 
point in one direction, namely that knot production involves at least a particular 
case of the more general problem of object recognition — i.e. knot recognition, 
and concomitantly that spatial representation abilities are also involved. 
 Now, the literature on visual object recognition is abundant, but it is 
possible to identify an important trend where it is assumed that object recog-
nition involves something akin to parsing in language. In the case of vision, a 
common view is to assume that object parsing involves the identification of a 
number of geometric primitives (often cylinders) — this is, for example, the 
approach of David Marr (1982) or of Irving Biederman (1987), to cite a couple of 
relevant examples. Underlying this is the assumption that spatial and object 
representation is entirely based on part-whole, or mereological, relations. This 
idea, however, has been subjected to several criticisms on the basis that parthood 
is insufficient to represent and recognize an object and that mereology needs to 
be complemented with the notion of connectedness, which is eminently topo-
logical. Casati & Varzi (1999), for example, have developed a long and detailed 
argument in favor of the idea that object and spatial representation is mereo-
topological, not just mereological — a proposal that finds some support in certain 
experimental results suggesting that object recognition often does not involve 
parsing (Cave & Kosslyn 1993).  
 How does all this relate to knots? If in spatial representation some topolo-
gical relations like connectedness are critically involved, it may well then be the 
case that our claim that the topological theory of Knots may be relevant is not 
that far fetched after all. Knots, real ones, have no obvious parts, just crossings in 
any of the three spatial dimensions and form a connected (even if open) whole, 
just like mathematical Knots or braids. Our contention was — and is — that it is 
this information that is important at the time of producing a knot or figuring out 
one; in other words that to make a knot, one needs first to represent it and to 
represent it one needs to figure out its topology. We maintain then that it follows 
that any act of knot tying, untying, learning, or invention is preceded, minimally 
by a mental act of knot recognition, which involves representing the basic 
Biolinguistics    Forum   
 
98 
properties of the knot, i.e. the number and orientation of its crossings.20 Fine and 
accurate motor control will only come afterwards, but, we argue, little headway 
will be made in, for example, knot learning if the focus is just on hand 
movements and not on the figure itself. Again, this is a debatable issue, and one 
can (with Lobina 2012: 10) legitimately stick to the behaviorist assumption that 
“it is very likely that knot-tying would proceed in a trial-and-error fashion”, 
although, in our opinion, the evidence presented here points in an entirely 
different direction. 
 And, so, we have finally come to knot recognition and how it relates to 
Knot recognition. Let’s start with the latter and proceed slowly until we 
eventually are able to see how it may be associated with the former. 
 A very important point to be made in order to understand Knot theory’s 
concerns with Knot recognition is condensed in Lobina’s following statement: 
“Knot Theory takes tied knots as its starting assumptions” (p. 75). Which is 
downright false. Knot theory does not only not take tied Knots as starting 
assumptions, but it is mainly concerned with proving that there exist other Knots 
apart from the trivial Knot (the so-called unknot), which is just a closed circle 
with no crossings. Adams (2004), for example, opens section 1.5 of his book (on 
page 22) with the following statement: “We have not yet proved that there is any 
other knot besides the unknot. For all we know right now, every projection of a knot 
[…] could simply be a messy projection of the unknot” (emphasis in the original) 
— despite this being, of course, “the most basic fact of knot theory”, i.e. the 
existence of other Knots apart from the unknot. Just as number theory cannot 
simply assume the existence of prime numbers — this needs to be proved, Knot 
theory does not simply assume that there are tied Knots — this also calls for a 
proof. And here is where Knot recognition comes into play. 
 From the false statement that Knot theory assumes that there are nontrivial 
Knots, Lobina derives the false conclusion that it is not the case that one of the 
fundamental problems in Knot theory is determining whether a string is knotted 
(p. 75). A couple of quotations will suffice, we hope, to settle this. Here’s the first: 
 
A loop in 3-space, called a knot, is unknotted or knotted: it is the funda-
mental problem of knot theory and we call it Unknotting. 




Determining whether a given knot is trivial or not is one of the histori-
cally central questions in topology.          (Agol et al. 2005: 3821) 
                                                
    20 This is not to be interpreted as a commitment with the idea that visual representations of 
knots are mental images or something similar. The characterization in the text is neutral 
with respect to that. The important factor is that crossings and orientation are represented 
somehow, and this can be captured by many different representational formats. 
    21 There is, by the way, a lurking inconsistency in the way Lobina uses the terms ‘trivial’ and 
‘non-trivial’ when referred to Knots. It seems that, for him, ‘trivial’ only applies to those 
projections of the unknot in which it looks like a circle, with ‘non-trivial’ being applied to 
those projections in which the unknot appears deformed (see his Figure 1). Another issue 
that needs to be settled: “The simplest knot of all is just the unknotted circle, which we call 
the unknot or the trivial knot” (Adams 2004: 2; emphasis in the original). 
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And, for good measure, yet another one:22 
 
[W]e will say that links have been classified if we can solve the recognition 
problem. That is, is there an algorithm that can decide, in a finite amount of 
time, if a given pair of links are equivalent? Notice that given such an 
algorithm, we could then enumerate all links […]. 
(Hoste 2005: 214; emphasis in the original) 
 
 A careful reading of Lobina’s text reveals a profound contradiction and, we 
are afraid, some difficulties in grasping a number of crucial subtleties of Knot 
theory on his part. Take first his personal account of the UNKNOTTING problem. 
He writes (p. 74):  
 
The ‘unknotting’ problem […] involves specifying an algorithm that can 
recognize the unknot in a figure like the one found on the right-hand side of 
Figure 1 (that is, convert the knot on the right-hand side into an unknot). 
 
Firstly, the parenthetical at the end is critical. Note that it presupposes that a 
deformation of the unknot is not the unknot, which it is — the unknot does not 
cease to be itself in any of its infinitely many different projections (and the Knot 
appearing on the right-hand side of Figure 1 in Lobina’s paper is a projection of 
the unknot). Secondly, this moreover presupposes that the UNKNOTTING problem 
just involves transforming a tangled projection of the unknot into an untangled 
one (a circle) through the successive application of Reidermeister moves, which, 
yes, are a set of operations that disentangle a Knot without damaging it. But this 
is not the UNKNOTTING problem. It cannot be. The UNKNOTTING problem is not an 
algorithm that can recognize the unknot, but rather an algorithm capable of 
providing an answer to the question ‘is this projection of a Knot a projection of 
the unknot?’ Note that in Lobina’s personal interpretation of the problem the 
answer to this question will always be, trivially, ‘yes’, because he is assuming 
that the only projections presented to the algorithm are projections of the unknot 
and, therefore, the Reidermeister moves will always, sooner or later, convert the 
projection into a circle.  
 The point, of course, and this should be clear from the quotations above, is 
that the algorithm may be presented with a projection of any imaginable Knot 
(the unknot included, of course) and, after the application of the Reidermeister 
moves, it may turn out that the answer will be ‘no’. For this to be possible, 
however, the algorithm must be able to tell apart the unknot from all other Knots. 
If it says ‘no’, the algorithm will certainly not tell us which Knot it is — we will 
just be certain that it is not the unknot. Note that this is the structure of any 
recognition problem, because recognition (decidability) is defined as the ability to 
answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a specific question concerning some language and, to be 
able to do that, an algorithm must be equipped with the necessary information to 
tell apart those elements that belong to the set from those that belong to its 
complement. When this is not possible, the problem is undecidable, i.e. we may 
get a ‘yes’ answer, but we will never get a ‘no’, with the HALTING problem for 
                                                
    22 Links are composite Knots, which can be decomposed into ‘prime Knots’. Therefore our 
discussion here focuses only on prime Knots, which are links with only one component. 
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Turing machines being the model for all undecidable problems.23 The way Lobina 
presents UNKNOTTING is as if we understood the problem of recognizing, say, the 
context-free language anbn as the problem of what a Turing machine (or a push-
down automaton for that matter) would do when presented with strings only 
belonging to that set, which is nonsense. 
 The reason why UNKNOTTING is so important for Knot theory is because it 
is precisely the proof that there are other Knots apart from the unknot. It is not an 
algorithm for listing Knots, of course, nothing like this seems to be forthcoming 
in the near future, just like no algorithm for calculating all prime numbers will be 
forthcoming either, although at least we know there are other primes beyond 2. 
 Finally, note that Lobina’s statement that “Knot Theory takes tied knots as 
its starting assumptions” (which it doesn’t) is simply contradictory with the idea 
that UKNOTTING merely involves disentangling projections of the unknot. If the 
existence of nontrivial Knots is assumed, why should the task of “working out 
the formal equivalence of two knots” (p. 74) be just concerned with showing that 
two projections of the same Knot are equivalent? Clearly because UNKNOTTING 
does not involve working out the formal equivalence of two knots, but rather 
telling apart the unknot and any Knot projection within the same equivalence 
class from other Knot projections not in this class. To find a parallelism, 
UNKNOTTING is as if we were asking ‘is x, x ∈ Q, in the same equivalence class as 
y, y ∈ Q?’ and we fixed y = ½. Then, with input x = 2/4 the answer will be ‘yes’ 
and with input x = 2/3 the answer will be ‘no’. Actually, this formulation of the 
recognition of equivalence classes in rational numbers comes closer to the other 
Knot recognition problem analyzed in Hass et al. (1999), the paper dealing with 
the complexity of Knot recognition problems we cited in Balari et al. (2011). This 
problem, which we will refer to as GENUS, is a generalization of UNKNOTTING in 
the sense that it can be parameterized just like the case of rational equivalence 
classes by fixing a value for y and then testing whether some x is in the same 
equivalence class as y. Note that this is precisely the kind of recognition problem 
to which Hoste (2005) is referring in the quotation above. 
 To see what GENUS does, we will first have to explain what the genus of a 
Knot is. Perhaps the best way to do this is with a picture like the one we have in 
Figure 2. 
                                                
    23 The reason being, of course, that the complement of HALTING is neither recursive nor 
recursively enumerable, and decidability implies that if we have a decision algorithm for a 
set, then we automatically have one for its complement. 















Figure 2:  The unknot (left) and the trefoil knot (right) as boundaries of a Seifert surface. The 
strands of the Knots appear in yellow and the surface is black. (The two images were generated 
with the SeifertView free software developed by Jarke J. van Wijk, Technische Universiteit Eind-
hoven.) 
 
As can be seen in the two images of the figure, Knots can be conceptualized as 
the boundaries of a continuous surface (a Seifert surface) such that the perimeter 
of the surface is entirely delineated by the strands of the Knot. Observe that in the 
case of the unknot, the object made up of the Knot plus the surface (Figure 2, left) 
is something like a drum or a tambourine — the surface has no holes in it. In the 
case of the trefoil Knot, however, the surface appears perforated (Figure 2, right). 
It is not immediately obvious from the direct inspection of the image, but the 
number of holes in the surface is in this case exactly 1.24 This is the genus of a 
Knot: The number of holes in the Seifert surface defined by its strands. Note that 
the genus of the unknot is 0 and that the genus of the trefoil Knot is 1. The genus 
of a Knot is an indirect indication of its degree of knottedness and, hence, we can 
formulate a recognition problem in which our question is: ‘Is the genus of this 
Knot equal to (smaller than, greater than) g, g an integer?’ This is the GENUS 
problem as formulated in Hass et al. (1999) and, perhaps more clearly, in Agol et 
al. (2002, 2005). UNKNOTTING is then a particular case of GENUS for the question: 
‘Is the genus of this Knot equal to 0?’ 
 Now that we have a proper definition of the two Knot recognition 
problems, we can turn to their complexity results. Hass et al. (1999) located 
UNKNOTTING in NP and GENUS in PSPACE. This is already an indication that 
Knot recognition, in its simplest case, is a language (remember that problems are 
languages) falling within a complexity space closer to that of natural language, 
since, according to Ristad (1993), NATURAL LANGUAGE is NP-complete. It could 
even be harder, and equivalent to context-sensitive recognition, given the 
PSPACE result for GENUS. In a later study, Agol et al. (2002, 2005) reclassified 
GENUS as NP-complete, i.e. exactly in the same complexity class as NATURAL 
LANGUAGE, while Kuperberg (2011) has recently reclassified UNKNOTTING in NP 
∩  coNP, reducing thus its complexity.  
                                                
    24 The trick is that it can be demonstrated that the surface is equivalent to a torus (a donut), a 
surface with a single hole. Other knots will define surfaces equivalent to two or more joined 
tori, while the unknot defines a surface that is equivalent to a sphere, which has genus 0 (no 
holes); see Adams (2004: chap. 4). 
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 The question remains open. Newer and more accurate complexity results 
may be forthcoming for Knot recognition, but it doesn’t seem likely that these 
will locate it in an entirely different complexity space. The computational 
complexity of natural language and that of Knot recognition are equivalent or 
very close to each other. These are uncontroversial facts, “not subject to rational 
debate”. What is debatable, of course, is the relevance of Knot recognition 
complexity results in the assessment of the complexity of knot recognition. It 
could be the case that knot recognition in humans is a totally different thing from 
Knot recognition, that it doesn’t have anything to do with topology and the 
identification of crossings in a knot and their orientation, whatever. We are open 
to discuss this. It’s a hypothesis, but a hypothesis that is as informed as it could 
possibly be given the state of the art of our knowledge of the issues at stake here. 
Nothing, anyway, that Lobina has been able to really call into question in his 
paper. And, in the end, it may well be the case that we are on the right track after 
all. 
 In his paper, Lobina cites an article by Alan Turing that was unknown to us 
(Turing 1954), where Turing presents a variety of the Knot recognition problem 
as one of the challenging puzzles in mathematics. To illustrate the problem, 
Turing describes a Knot and a method for representing Knots that allows him to 
reduce a 3D object to a string of symbols. Turing’s technique essentially consists 
of selecting a number of points in a system of Cartesian coordinates and joining 
them with segments in order to get a closed, connected loop. In addition, Turing 
encodes the directionality of each segment with a letter, such that a single step 
from n to n+1 in X is encoded by an a, a step from n to n-1 in X is encoded by a d, 

























Figure 3:  A representation of the trefoil knot in a system of Cartesian coordinates. (Adapted from 
figure (1b), p. 586, of The Essential Turing, B. Jack Copeland (ed.), Oxford University Press.)  
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 With this representation system, the trefoil Knot can be encoded with the 
string in (1) and Knot recognition is reduced to a language recognition problem 




Note that the basic constraint seems to be that the number of as is equal to the 
number of ds, the number of bs is equal to the number of es, and the number of cs 
is equal to the number of fs. There are probably others, since it is not clear that 
any arrangement of these symbols always describes a Knot. Whatever the 
solution, this mode of representation would open a way to investigate more 
thoroughly the question of Knot representation and recognition, which as we 
contended in our earlier papers — and we have come to corroborate here with 
Turing’s system — is not a trivial task. Thus, and depending on what the exact 
characterization of this ‘Knot language’ is, we seem to have here a language like 
the following: 
 
(2) K = {ancmepbndmfp} 
 
 Assuming that the only constraint to adequately describing a Knot is that 
the number of positive steps in one dimension equals the number of negative 
steps in the same dimension, but that all positive and negative steps in all three 
dimensions need not be equal. This is a mildly-context sensitive language with 
three cross-serial dependencies. However, if the number of positive and negative 
steps must be the same in all dimensions, then we would seem to have a six-
column language like the following: 
 
(3) K = {ancnenbndnfn} 
 
Which is indexed, and probably equivalent to the triple-copy language in (4), all 
beyond the power of mildly context-sensitive systems (Radzinski 1991) and, 
hence possibly residing in a higher complexity class than natural language. 
 
(4)  K = {www|w ∈ (a+b)*} 
 
 Be this as it may, Turing’s is a rather clear, and perhaps more intuitive, 
method for representing Knots that easily captures their two basic properties. 
Also, it makes their formal complexity more perspicuous, as can be seen from the 
quick analysis we have just presented.25 This analysis, even if a rough one, 
demonstrates that Knots (and knots) are complex objects, but no too complex, 
perhaps sitting in a region of complexity space similar or not too far away from 
that of language, as it was originally conjectured by Camps & Uriagereka (2006). 
                                                
    25 Turing’s method is not too different from the Dowker notation for representing Knots, since 
both give us an indication of the number of crossings. In the Dowker notation each crossing 
is represented by an ordered pair of integers, (x, y), where x is odd and y is even, such that 
the number of pairs (or an ordered list of even numbers) equals the number of crossings in 
the knot. In this notation, however, it is harder to ‘read’ the orientation of the crossings than 
in Turing’s, where it can be immediately identified by the change from one symbol to 
another in the string. 
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 On the whole, and considering the different kinds of data we have 
presented here, it seems likely that natural computational systems, knots, and 
language do not define such a bizarre love triangle after all as pretended by 
Lobina. Paraphrasing Bernard Sumner et al.’s (1986) lyrics, we still feel compelled 
to sing: “If you say the words that I can’t say, maybe it’s because you can tie the 
knots that I can’t tie”. Why should we refrain from investigating it? 
 Camps & Uriagereka (2006) opened their conclusions section with the 
following words (p. 63; our emphasis): 
 
Our conclusion within this paper is not subject to rational debate: knots are 
not describable by any generative procedure that does not have enough 
operational memory to count as context-sensitive […]. 
 
Meaning, of course, that the inherent complexity of knots is an uncontroversial 
fact. It’s there. And any attempt to model human knot-tying abilities will have to 
take it into account. Just like the results concerning the inherent structural and 
computational complexity of natural language are there and must serve to drive 
our research in biolinguistics. This was Camps & Uriagereka’s (2006) message 
and it is our message here. 
 A fragment taken from the quotation above appears to be one of Lobina’s 
favorites, especially when dropped here and there out of context, or even in the 
wrong context. It is however surprising to what an extent has Lobina come to 
believe his own interpretation of the fragment and how faithfully he applies it in 
his criticisms. A theory, like a knot, is a difficult thing to construct — and like a 
knot is easier to cut than to entangle, a theory too is easier to trash than to refute. 
Some people spend their lives telling others that “they don’t understand”. It 
would be useful to see what it is that the critics understand, and how that 
understanding has solutions of any sort to the real problems that science poses, 
or even how these dynamics allow us to turn absolute mysteries into workable 
problems. Nothing in Lobina advances our understanding of the problems that 
were at stake here. It is a classic instance of formal bullying, whereby tools that 
ought to help us gain insight over our subject matter manage to turn into 
rhetorical cilices for no discernible purpose other than posturing. It is sad to see 
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